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ABStRACT
Thispaper presents quantitative estimates of the private
value of property rights conferred by patent protection for
different technology fields and countries of ownership. The
measures are derived from parametric estimation of a model of
patent renewal, using a new data set on patent renewals in France
during the period 1969-1987. The results show that patent
protection is a significant, but not the major, source of private
returns to inventive activity and that its importance varies
sharply across technology fields. The paper quantifies the
equivalent subsidy to R&D generated by the patent system,
characterizes variations in the value of patent rights across
technology fields, countries of ownership and time, and explores
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and
NBERThis paper provides empirical estimates of the importance of the
patent system as a source of economic returns to inventive activity. In the
literature on intellectual property rights, and from a public policy
perspective, two central questions are whether the patent system is a
quantitatively important incentive mechanism and whether its importance varies
across different, broadly defined technology areas (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson
and Winter 1987).Patents are one of several alternative devices to
appropriate the gains from invention, and the decision to patent presumably
rests on the comparative effectiveness of these devices.To a first
approximation, the private value of the patent system can be measured by the
incremental returns from inventions protected by patents, above and beyond the
gains that would be appropriable by the second—best means.
The basic empirical difficulty is that there are no active markets in
patents where direct valuation of patent rights can be observed.The
available evidence on the importance of patent protection is based exclusively
on survey data (Taylor and Silberston 1973; Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner
1981; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter 1987). This literature points to
two main conclusions: first, that patents are not the exclusive or even
primary device for protecting inventions in most industries, and second, that
reliance on patents is much greater in some industries (especially
pharmaceuticals) than in others.
This paper contributes econometric evidence to the discussion. The
empirical analysis is based on the model of patent renewal developed by
Schankerman and Fakes (1986). In most countries patentees are required to pay
1annual fees in order to maintain patent protection. On the assumption that
the renewal decision is based on the private returns generated by the patent
right, patent renewal data can be used to infer the private value of patent
protection. The analysis in this paper is based on a new and extensive data
set on patent renewals •containingvirtually all patents applied for in France
during the period 1969—1982.The renewal data are disaggregated both by
technology field and country of origin, which allows one to investigate
variations in the importance of patent rights across these dimensions.
Patent renewal data can only inform about the private value of patent
rights. Nonappropriable (social) returns are presumably not relevant to, and
hence cannot be revealed by, the patentee's renewal decision. Beyond that
limitation, however, two important points should be kept in mind in
interpreting results based on patent renewal data.First, there is an
important distinction between the valuation of the patent system before and
after the decision to patent (ex ante and ex post valuation). The renewal
decision is required only after the decision to apply for a patent. As
Horstman, MacDonald and Silvinski (1985) emphasise, the patent application
itself reveals private information about the invention. Once this information
has been disclosed, it may be very difficult to appropriate rents without
patent protection.Hence, the willingness to pay to maintain patent
protection after disclosure will be greater than before the decision to patent
is taken. On this account, the estimates in this paper represent an upper
bound to the private returns generated by the patent sytem ex ante. On the
other hand, Judd (1989) has emphasised that the patent system may generate
private returns by discouraging competition at the invention stage merely by
offering the possibility of a patent, even if no patent is actually taken out
by the winner. Hence patent renewal data may not fully capture the private
2gains due to strategic responses and may underestimate the private value of
the patent system.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the data set.
The patent renewal model and stochastic specification are summarised in
Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical results for the four technology
fields (pooling the countries of origin). This material includes parametric
estimates of the patent renewal model (Section 3.l) the distributions of the
value of patent rights (Section 3.2), computations of the equivalent subsidy
to R&D conferred by patent protection (Section 3.3), and movements over time
in patent counts and patent values (Section 3.4). Section 4 presents the
empirical results allowing for differences across countries of origin within
each technology field. This material includes parametric estimates of the
model and the implied differences in mean value across countries of origin and
over time (Section 4.1), and some evidence on the determinants of these
variations (Section 4.2). Concluding remarks sumniarise the main empirical
findings.
3Section 1. DescriDtion of the Data Set
The data set was constructed from computerised files of individual
patents from the French Patent Office (see Schankerman 1990 for details). The
data cover all patent applications in France during the period 1969—1987,
disaggregated in three dimensions: the technology field to which the patent
is assigned, the country of origin, and the date the patent application is
filed (cohort). For each technology field/country cell
•thedata set contains
the number of patent applications per cohort, the number of patents granted
per cohort during each of the years subsequent to application cohort date, and
the number of patent renewals per cohort at each availableage.
Each patent is assigned by the patent examiner to one primary technology
group according to the International. Patent Classification (IPC). Assignment
is based on the function of the invention (e.g..conveyer belts would be
classified as industrial transport apparatus), which may differ both from an
industry of origin and industry of use criterion. The patent is identified
by the country of the owner (normally but not always the inventor), which I
refer to hereafter as country of origin. The countries of origin include
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. The raw
data contain seventeen technology groups that account for the bulk (over 90
percent) of patent applications in France. For this paper the groups are
consolidated into four major technology fields: pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
mechanical, and electronics. This categorisation is designed to capture the
broad distinctions between patents based on fundamentally differenttypes of
technologies.
-
informationon patent renewal fees was obtained directly from the French
Patent Office.Renewal fee schedules were changed frequently during the
sample period, but the prevailing schedule applied to all patents regardless
4of cohort, technology field, or country of origin. The renewal fees start
at very low levels and rise monotonically as the patent ages. By age nineteen
(the last age in the sample) the renewal fee is about $400 per patent (in 1980
U.S. dollars).'
The pattern of renewal rates varies across technology fields and
countries of origin, but certain features do emerge.To conserve space,
Figure 1 presents the age path of renewal rates for each technology field,
averaged over countries of origin excluding Japan. Figure 2 provides the
renewal rates for patents from Japan.There is substantial attrition as
patents age, with about fifty percent of patents dropping out before they
reach age ten.This general feature holds for all technology fields and
countries of origin. For all countries of origin, except Japan, renewal rates
for pharmaceuticals and chemicals are generally higher than for mechanical and
electronics patents. The differences summarised in Figure 1 are particularly
clear for France and the United Kingdom, while for Germany and the United
States the renewal patterns are very similar across technology fields (not
shown in the figure). This ranking of technology fields is sharply reversed
for patents of Japanese origin, where renewal rates are highest in electronics
and lowest in pharmaceuticals. The differences in renewal patterns across
countries of origin are presented in Figures 3—6. In each technology field
the renewal rates are much higher for patents from France and Japan than for
the other three countries. Japan particularly stands out in the mechanical
and electronics fields.
These rankings of renewal curves provide some limited information about
the value of patent rights, without resorting to parametric estimation of the
patent renewal model. In a study of nonparametric methods for patent renewal
data, Pakes and Simpson (1989) develop a test of the null hypothesis that the
value distributions for different groups of patents are identical. The test
5is based on a comparison between the mortality rates at each age in different
groups of patents (facing the same renewal fee schedules).I apply this
nonparametric (chi—square) test to variations among countries of origin and
technology fields. Let1rdenote the mortality rate at age a for patents
from cohort c, where i and j represent the country of origin and technology
field respectively. The null hypothesis that the value distributions do not
differ across technology fields is equivalent to the restriction 1i: 1r —
forall .t.To test for differences across countries of origin, the null
hypothesis is H: irU —it forall j.
Table 2 summarises the test results. Under the null hypothesis, the
expected value of the x/d statistic is unity. The hypothesis that the value
distribution is the same for all technology fields is rejected decisively for
each country of origin (Panel A). The hypothesis that the value distribution
is the same for all countries of origin is also strongly rejected for each
technology field (Panel 8). These results show that there is both within—
technology field and within—country of origin variation in value
distributions.2 The parametric specification of the patent renewal model in
Sections 2 and 4 will allow for differences in these dimensions.
Prior to 1968 there was no effective screening of patent applications in
France. The French Patent Office was not legally bound to impose substantive
criteria of acceptability, and all patent applications that met certain
minimal procedural guidelines were granted. In 1968 a new patent law imposed
substantive criteria and instructed the French Patent Office to enforce them.
Table 1 shows that this patent reform was associated with dramatic changes in
grant rates (computed as the ratio of cumulated grants from a given cohort to
the number of patent applications for that cohort).Two facts are of
particular importance. First, there was a very sharp decline in the grant
rate over time for each technology field and country of origin. Second, there
6are systematic rankings of technology fields and countries of origin in terms
of grant rates.Reading across the rows in the table, the ranking of
technology fields (in descending order) is pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
electronics, and mechanical. This ranking holds for each country of origin
and the differences in the grant rates are large. Reading down the columns,
the typical ranking countries of origin (within a given technology field) is
Japan, France, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom.
These findings yield two testable implications. First, if the decline
in grant rates reflects more stringent screening that weeds out low value
patents, it should raise the mean value of patent rights in the population of
granted patents over time. Second, higher grant rates for a country of origin
within a given technology field should be associated with a larger mean value
of patent rights, provided the patent screening criteria do not depend on
which country is applying for the patent.3 These hypotheses are investigated
in Section 4, using estimates of mean value from the patent renewal model.
Section 2. Mode]. of Patent Renewal
The empirical work is based on the model developed by Schankerman and
Pakes (1986). Consider an agent who holds a patent. Let c denote the cohort
of the patent and a denote the age of the patent. In order to keep the patent
in force the patentee must pay an annual renewal fee, and failure to pay
terminates patent protection permanently. The renewal fee varies with the age
and possibly the cohort of the patent.Let {Cac}..idenotethe sequence of
renewal fees (in real terms) at different ages. The (annual) economic returns
to holding the patent at age a (in real terms) is denoted by R.. These
returns include any economic benefits to the patentee that would not have
accrued in the absence of the patent protection.The sequence (R.)1 is
7assumed to be known with certainty by the patentee at the time the patent is
applied for (when patent protection begins).The decision problem is to
maximise the discounted value of net revenues accruing to the patent by
choosing an optimal age at which to stop paying the renewal fee. Formally,
the agent chooses the lifespan of the patent, T, to
Maxv(r)E — c.) (1)
TICI H)
where$isthe discount factor and N is the statutory limit to patent
protection. Provided the sequence of net revenues is non—increasing
in age, the condition for renewal of the patent at age a is that the annual
returns to holding the patent cover the renewal fee,
(2)
Since renewal fees are increasing in age, a sufficient condition for this
renewal rule to be optimal is that the returns to holding a patent decay over
time .
Ifthe sequence of returns were the same for all patents in a given
cohort, then patents would be cancelled at the same age and the renewal curve
would be degenerate.Since this is not consistent with observed renewal
curves, the model allows patents in a given cohort to differ in their initial
revenues (representing them as random draws from some distribution), but
assumes that the sequence of decay rates is the same for all patents. Under
these assumptions, the condition for renewal of a patent at age a can be
written: > ce,, IIdwhere i—6 . LetF(L;e) be the
distribution function of initial revenues, where e, denotes a vector of
parameters that characterises the distribution and may be different across
8cohorts of patents.Then the proportion of patents in cohort c that is
renewed at age a, is
1 dF(R0;O) = 1—F(z.;O) (3)
where —J C'.
.Givenan assumed functional form for the
distribution of initial revenues, equation (3) provides the
relationship between the sequence of renewal proportions predicted by the
model and the unknown parameters (the vector e and (6.}) The estimation
problem is to choose those parameter values that make the predicted renewal
proportions as "close" to the observed proportions as possible.
On the basis of a comparison among alternative functional forms, the
lognormal specification for F(R;8) is used.5 The data set contains four
dimensions that must be incorporated in the parameterisation of the model.
Denote the country of origin by .1, the technology field by j, the cohort by
c, and the age of the patent by a.Assume that initial revenues distribute
lognormally and let lower case letters denote the logarithm of upper case
ones.Then we have r —N(4.o))where N(m) designates the normal
distribution. In logarithmic form, the decision rule is to renew a patent at





Theleft hand side of (4) has a standard normal distribution, so the
proportion of patents that has dropped out by age a is given by
= = i-t(4.) (5)
9where t() is the standardised normal distribution function. This implies the
general form of the model,
—'- 1 1d Ic+ nC40 , '6 ii— c—i y.c—
aj
where y a'(l — Ps).
Given only data on renewal rates for each of the cells defined by the
fourdimensions, one cannot allow the parameters for the lognormal
distribution and decay rates to be completely free. Some simplification of
the parameterisation in (6) is required. The model is estimated separately
for each technology group, so allparametersare allowed to vary across
technology groups.I also permit the mean value of patent rights for any
given technology group to differ across cohorts and countries of origin. For
the lognormal distribution, the mean of initial revenues depends onp and a
but the coefficient of variation depends only on c.6Theprocedure followed
here is to allow for the parameter ptobe specific to the cohort and country
of origin, but to maintain a common value of a.This is equivalent to
allowing for a proportional rescaling of initial revenues of all patents in
a given cell —themean may differ but the coefficient of variation is common.
Section 3 reports the empirical work based on data pooled across countries of
origin for each technology group —thatis, imposing the constraint 45—
forall i.Section 4 explores the empirical differences across countries of
origin, permitting p to be freely parameterised. The decay rate is assumed
to be common to different countries of origin within a given technologygroup
and constant over time. However, the decay rate is permitted to differ in
1974 and 1980 in order to capture the impact of the major oil price shocks
during those years. These effects are year—specific and apply to any patent
that is in force during those years. regardless ofpatent age.7
10The stochastic specification allows for two disturbances. The first is
an error tern in the renewal rule (4), ,,thatis assumed to have zero mean
and constant variance, o. The second disturbance is a binomial sampling
error in the observed renewal proportion, The variance of the sampling
error is given by P.(l—P.)/A. where A is the number of patents in cohort c.
This is introduced because some observed renewal rates are based on cells with
relatively few observations (especially recent cohorts in pharmaceuticals).0
Letting u. denote the composite disturbance and incorporating these
specifications, the model can be written









(1if C C 1980 and a+c ) 1980
D2 =
(0elsewhere
Note that 6 is the baseline decay rate applicable in all years except 1974 and
1980, and 6 and & are the year—specific decay rates. Because the composite
disturbance is heteroskedastic, equation (7) is estimated by generalised
nonlinear least squares.91°
11Section 3. Empirical Results by Technology Field
3.1 Estimates of the Patent Renewal Model
Table 3 presents the empirical results for different versions of the
model, separately for each technology field (pooled across countries of
origin).To facilitate discussion, I focus first on a comparison across
different specifications, and then turn to the parameter estimates in the
preferred specification and compare across technology field. Regression (1)
for each technology field refers to the model with a constant decay rate and
no cohort—specific variation in p(i.e.p —pfor all c, which is called the
no—effects model). Regression (2) allows for a completely free sequence of
cohort effects in p, andis called the fixed effects model. The null
hypothesis that there are no cohort effects in p is rejected in each
technology group. The computed test statistic TI varies between 3.5 and 5.5
depending on the technology group, compared to a critical value at the 0.05
level of 1.75 (2.18 at the 0.01 level). This implies that significant changes
have occurred in the mean value of patent rights during the peflod 1969—1982
in all technology groups.These changes are discussed in more detail in
Section 3.4.
Regression (3) refers to the fixed effects model that allows for the
decay rate to differ during the years of the large oil price changes, 1974 and
1980. The null hypothesis that the decay rate does not change during these
years is strongly rejected in each technology group.The computed test
statistic T2 is around ten or more, compared to a critical value at the 0.05
level of 3.0 (4.6 at the 0.01 level).Since the parameters and 6
represent year effects (regardless of patent age) ,thisevidence reflects the
12fact that the dropout rate for all cohorts of patents was abnormally high
during 1974 and 1980. Interpretation of these oil price effects is discussed
later in this section.
Consider next the comparison of parameter estimates across the technology
groups. For this purpose I focus on the model with cohort effects in pand
oil price effects in 6, but the conclusions all hold for the model without oil
shocks. In all technology fields the parameters estimates have the expected
sign and are statistically significant (6 in pharmaceuticals and chemicals
being a marginal exception). The estimates of a indicate that the
distribution of initial revenues exhibits both substantial dispersion and
skewness,the degree of dispersion is illustrated by the coefficient of
variation, which varies from 2.6 in pharmaceuticals to 16.2 in electronics.
The degree of skewness is illustrated by the ratio of the mean to the median
of initial revenues, which for the lognormal is exp(½ a2). This ratio varies
from 2.4 in pharmaceuticals to 16.2 in electronics.Note also that
differences across technology fields in parepositively correlated with those
in a, so that technology groups with higher mean and median levels of initial
revenues also have greater dispersion and skewness. The estimates of the rate
of decay in returns from holding patents also vary substantially across
technology groups.The rates of decay in the pharmaceutical and chemical
sectors are similar to each other and rather low, on the order of 5 percent
per year, but in the mechanical and electronics technology fields the decay
rate is between 10 and 15 percent.
In summary, a sharp picture emerges from these results.The key
empirical finding is that the parameters segregate the technology groups into
two distinct categories. The first, comprised of pharmaceuticals and
chemicals, is characterised by comparatively low values of p,aand 6. The
distribution of initial returns to holding a patent in these sectors exhibits
13low median and mean returns, less dispersion and skewness, and a slow rate of
decay in privately appropriable returns.The second field, composed of
mechanical and electronic patents, is characterised by larger values of p. a
and 6.The distribution in these sectors exhibits higher median and mean
returns, a greater degree of dispersion and skewness, and a much faster rate
of obsolescencej' The implications of these parameters for the distribution
of the value of patent rights are considered in Section 3.2.
The estimates of the decay rates for 1974 and 1980 provide strong
evidence that the oil price shocks reduced the value of the stock of patents
in force. The point estimates of 674implythat the contemporaneous returns
to holding a patent declined by between 39 and 65 percent in 1974, and the
estimates are precise. The decline associated with the second oil price shock
in 1980 is somewhat smaller but still substantial, varying between 21 and 39
percent. These parameters may seem unreasonably large, but it is important
to remember that they measure the effect on current returns to holding a
patent, not the discounted value of the stream of returns. The parameters can
be used to deduce the impact on the discounted value of returns —thatis, on
the value of the patent rights (see Appendix I for the method). In this form
the estimates of 674 and 5 imply that the oil price shocks reduced the
discounted value of patent rights for the stock of patents in force by about
24 percent in 1974 and 18 percent in 1980. The estimated impact is almost
identical in each of the four technology groups.12
To put this finding in perspective, note that the average decline in
Tobin's—Q for the manufacturing sector in five major OECD countries was about
21 percent in 1974—75 and 13 percent in 1980—81 (see Chan—Lee 1986). Hence,
the econometric evidence from the patent renewal model indicates that the
downward revaluation of the stock of patent rights due to the oil price shocks
was large, roughly similar to (if not greater than) the observed decline in
14the stock market valuation of (physical and intangible) capital at the
manufacturing level.
As described in Section 1, the ranking across technology fields by patent
renewal rates is very different for patents applied for by Japan than for
other countries of origin. To check whether the inclusion of Japan affects
the two—way grouping of technology fields, the fixed effects model with and
without oil price effects was re—estimated on data excluding patents from
Japan. The results (not reported to conserve space) show that the exclusion
of Japan does change the key finding that there are two distinct
categories —pharmaceuticalsand chemicals in one, mechanical and electronics
in the other —orthe main characteristics of the parameters in each category.
The main effect of excluding Japan is to lower the estimate of p.The
estimate declines by about 0.15 in the pharmaceuticals, chemicals and
mechanical groups, but by about 1.0 in electronics. Since the mean value of
initial revenues is a (exponential) function of p, these results suggest that
Japanese patents in France are more valuable than those from other countries,
especially in electronics where the difference may be very large. To address
this issue more fully, Section 4 presents empirical estimates of the model
allowing for differences across all countries of origin.
3.2 Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights
In this section the parameter estimates from Table 3 are used to derive
the distribution of the value of patent rights. The net present value of
patent rights for a single patent is V —It0E1[(1_6/(l+i)]t where R0 is the
initial returns from holding the patent, i is the discount rate, and V is the
optimal lifespan of the patent. The lognormal distribution on It0 induces a
15distribution of these values. The parameters p, a and S can be used to
generate the quantiles of the distribution of V and their standard errors by
simulating the value distribution.'3
Table 4 presents the distribution of the value of patent rights for the
1970 cohort of patents in each technology field. The value of patent rights
includes all net returns accruing from the date of application until the
optimal expiration date. The distribution is generated for the model with oil
shocks to the decay rate since that model is favored by the data, but the main
conclusions also hold for the model without oil shocks.
The most prominent feature of the distributions is the sharp skewness in
each technology field. Most patents have very little private value. The
median value of patent rights (in 1980 U.S. dollars) is only $1631 in
pharmaceuticals, $1594 in chemicals, $2930 in mechanical, and $3159 In
electronics (excluding Japan). The value of patents rights rises sharply with
the quantile, especially in the mechanical and electronics technology groups.
There are some highly valuable patents in the tails of the distributions, as
shown by the upper quantiles, and these patents account for a large fraction
of the total value of patent rights for the 1970 cohort in eacl3 technology
group. The top one percent of patents accounts for about 15 percent of the
total value of patent rights in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and about 25
percent in mechanical and electronics (excluding Japan). The top five percent
of patents accounts for about 40 percent of total value in pharmaceuticals and
chemicals, and more than 50 percent in the mechanical and electronics
groups." The quantiles of the distribution are estimated quite precisely in
pharmaceuticals and chemicals. The precision is worse for the mechanical and
electronics technology fields, especially in the upper five percent of the
tail. Nonetheless, the estimates indicate clear differences across technology
fields in the mean value of patent rights. The mean value is estimated to be
16$4313 in pharmaceuticals, $4969 in chemicals, $15,120 for mechanical patents,
and $19,837 in electronics (excluding Japan).The estimates in Table 4
confirm that the technology fields break down into two distinct categories.
Both in terms of the mean value and the degree of skewness in the
distributions, there is clear evidence that pharmaceutical and chemical
patents fall into one category and mechanical and electronics patents into
another.
A comparison of the last two columns in Table 4 also shows that
including electronics patents of Japanese origin raises the mean value of
patent rights for that technology field by a factor of three and greatly
reduces the precision of the estimates. A more detailed look at differences
across countries of origin is provided in Section 4.
3,3 Equivalent Subsidy to R&D
The estimates of mean value can be used to obtain the total value of
patent rights for a given cohort of patents in each technology field. A
comparison between the total value of patent rights and the R&D expenditures
used to produce those patents provides an estimate of the subsidy rate to R&D
conferred by the patent system (hereafter, the equivalent subsidy rate). This
section presents estimates of the equivalent subsidy rate for each technology
field for the 1970 cohort of patents.
Suppose for argument that all inventive output is patented, inventions
have no private value unless they are patented, and that the level of R&D is
adjusted until It earns a normal rate of return at the margin.For the
marginal patent, the ratio of the value of patent rights (discounted at the
cost of capital) to R&D would equal unity —i.e.,a 100 percent subsidy rate
since patent protection is the only source of returns to invention. In fact
17the equivalent subsidy rate will be less than unity, because some inventions
are not patented and those that are retain private value even without patent
protection. As such, the equivalent subsidy rate is a summary index of the
"importance" of patent protection, Of course, the equivalent subsidy rate
computed for an entire cohort of patents will be an upper bound to the
marginal subsidy conferred by patent protection, if there are diminishing
returns to R&D.
The total value of patent rights is obtained by multiplying the
estimates of mean value from table 4 by the number of patent applications.
To construct the measure of R&D, one requires a concordance between the
industrial classification of available R&D data and the technology
classification of patents, and a procedure to apportion the R&D performed by
each country of origin to the patents it holds in France (see Appendix 2 for
details). The 1970 data on R&D are used since the lag between R&D and patent
applications is very short (Fakes and Schankerman 1984; Hall, Criliches and
Hausman 1986).Computations are done for company—funded and total R&D
performed by business enterprises.
Table S summarises the results. The estimated subsidy rate to total R&D
is 15.6 percent, and 24.2 percent for company—funded R&D (averaged over
technology fields).'617Hence patent protection generates perhaps as much
as a quarter of the private returns to inventive activity. Of course, this
means at least 75 percent of the private returns to invention are obtained
from sources other than patents. This finding is consistent with qualitative
survey evidence that firms rely on many methods to appropriate the rents from
invention (for example, see Levin et.al. 1987). The size of the (average)
equivalent subsidy rate is also consistent with quantitative survey evidence
of specific inventions, Mansfield et.al. (1981) report that patent protection
raises imitation costs by about 11 percent (median estimate).In a
18competitive R&D market without patent protection, these costs would be
dissipated through additional imitation. With patent protection, these costs
presumably accrue to the patentee and hence represent the value of the patent
right. Therefore, the average subsidy rate obtained from the patent renewal
model should be similar to the increase in the costs of imitation, and it is
(15 versus 11 percent).
The importance of patent protection as a source of returns to R&D varies
widely across technology fields. The equivalent subsidy rate varies from 4.0
percent in pharmaceuticals to 21.4 percent in electronics (using total R&D).
These variations are due to differences in the mean value of patent rights
(since there is little variation in the ratios of the number of patents to R&D
—seerows 3 and 4). On this measure, the patent system appears most effective
in the mechanical and electronics technology groups, and least effective in
pharmaceuticals and chemicals.
This ranking is sharply at odds with the conventional wisdom that patent
protection is important for pharmaceuticals and chemicals but not for the
mechanical and electronics sectors. All available survey evidence points to
this conclusion (for example Taylor and Silberston 1973; Mansfield et.al.
1981; Levin et.al. 1987). How can one reconcile the rankings based on survey
evidence with those derived from the patent renewal model? The main sector
requiring explanation is pharmaceuticals, since survey evidence indicates that
patents raise imitation costs for drugs by 30—40 percent (Mansfield et.al.
1981; Levin et.al. 1987).The equivalent subsidy rates for mechanical and
electronics patents (13.9 and 21.4 percent) are actually not that different
from estimates of the increase in imitation costs due to patents in these
sectors (7—15 percent).
The main explanation for pharmaceuticals lies in the institutional
context. There has been strict price regulation of patented pharmaceutical
19products in France since 1945. Every patentee (regardless of country of
origin) must obtain governmental authorisation to market any pharmaceutical
invention.For ethical drugs the authorisation involves agreement on an
administered price which applies to all reimbursed purchases in the private
and public sectors.18 For "parapharmaceuticals" the regulation is less
formal —theauthorities fix "recommended prices" for manufacturers which are
normally respected. This governmental price regulation would certainly be
expected to reduce the private value of patent rights for pharmaceutical
patents. This reduction in mean value occurs for two reasons.The whole
distribution of the value of patent rights will be shifted to the left since
price regulation applies to all pharmaceutical patents. Price regulation
should also reduce the skewness of the distribution of appropriable returns,
since huge rents on important products would presumably be disallowed. This
further reduces the mean value of patent rights.In the extreme case where
price regulation allows for only a normal return to R&D costs, patent
protection would be worthless and the equivalent subsidy rate would fall to
zero. Effective price regulation may be an important determinant of the low
equivalent subsidy rate for pharmaceuticals.
There is a second explanation also due to price regulation.The
procedure to compute the R&D costs for pharmaceutical patents held in France
may overstate the true costs, and hence understate the true subsidy rate. R&D
for each country of origin is allocated to its patents held in France in
proportion to the ratio of its exports (to France) to total sales.This
corresponds to the profit maximising allocation of common R&D costs for a
monopolist (patentee) selling in a number of markets with the same price
elasticity.However, price regulation in France raises the effective price
elasticity facing the patentee and lowers the profit maximising allocation of
R&D to the French market. While some form of pharmaceutical price regulation
20for pharmaceuticals exists in a number of countries, it is effectively absent
in the largest market, the United States.
It is not possible to assess the quantitative importance of these two
factors without more information on the demand structure and regulatory price
determination. But they underscore the important point that the
effectiveness of patent protection depends on the broader institutional
setting, including other forms of regulation impinging on an industry.
3.4 Patent Counts and Mean Value
It is common practice to use the number of patents as an indicator of
patented (more broadly, inventive) output.The validity of this practice
depends on whether the mean value of patents varies over time, and whether
those changes are correlated with movements in patent counts. The value of
patents themselves cannot be measured directly, but there is good reason to
expect that the value of patent rights would be correlated with it.This
section sununarises movements in the mean value of patent rights over time for
each technology field, and characterises the relationship between the quantity
and uqualityu of patents.
Figures 7—10 present indices of the number of patent applications,
mean value and total value of patent rights for each technology field
(normalised in 1969).'° There are two distinct subperiods 1969—1976 and 1977—
1981.During the first period the number of patent applications declines
about fifteen percent in each technology field, except pharmaceuticals where
it rises by about the same amount. The mean value of patent rights shows a
modest decline, except for the cohorts immediately after the major oil shock
(1973 and 1974) where it falls sharply in each technology field.
The number of patent applications in France fell sharply during the
second period, by about ninety percent in pharmaceuticals and fifty percent
21in the other technology fields. These declines had little to do with a fall
in real inventive output, however, reflecting instead the introduction of the
European Patent Convention in 1978. The European patent conferred protection
for an invention in multiple designated member countries, the application fee
depending on the number of countries specified by the patentee. The effect
was to reduce the cost of multiple applications for the same patent. The data
set used in this paper contains French national patents but excludes European
patents with France as a designated state. Hence, any self—selection into
European patents would register as a decline in the number of patent
applications in France. The evidence in the figures indicates that a process
of self—selection is at work. The sharp break in the path of patent
applications occurs in 1977, just when the European Patent Convention became
effective. The drop is especially severe in pharmaceuticals and chemicals,
but even in the mechanical and electronic technology groups there is evidence
of an accelerated decline at that time.2°
It has been argued in the literature on intellectual property that
patents taken out in multiple countries are more likely to be higher value
patents (Soete and Wyatt 1983; Basberg 1983).Since the European patent
economises on multiple applications, the introduction of this option should
have lowered the mean value of national patents applied for in France. In
fact the opposite occurred. There is a sharp increase in the mean value of
patent rights in each technology field which occurs quite abruptly in 1977,
though in pharmaceuticals and chemicals there is some more gradual increase
beginning in 1975. This striking negative covariance between movements in
patent counts and mean value, and their timing, strongly suggest that the
process of self—selection into European Patents is not random with respect to
the value of patents.The evidence supports the hypothesis that the
relatively low valued patents were taken out as European Patents.
22Section 4. EnMrical Results by Technology Field and Country of Origin
4.1 Estimates of the Patent Renewal Model
The nonparametric tests reported in Section 1 indicated that there are
variations in the value distributions both across technology fields and
countries of origin.This section presents results from a parametric
specification of the patent renewal model that incorporates differences across
countries of origin as well as technology fields. There are two reasons to
conduct this analysis. The first is to check whether allowing for differences
across countries of origin changes the basic empirical characterisation of
technology groups presented in Section 3.The second is to measure the
differences across countries of origin in the mean value of patent rights and
to explore the determinants of those differences.
The specification used in this section allows for a completely
unrestricted sequence (Pc)-1 for each country of origin, but imposes the same
value of a and iS. This is equivalent to allowing for a proportional rescaling
of initial revenues of all patents (for a given cohort) in different countries
of origin.The specification permits the time path of mean values over
cohorts to differ for each country of origin but imposes a common coefficient
of variation.
Table 6 presents the empirical results (for brevity, the estimate of p
forthe 1970 cohort is reported) for the model with oil shocks, but the
conclusions also hold for the baseline model. The estimates of pdovary
across countries of origin. The restriction that there are no differences,
—/4 forall i, is decisively rejected for each technology group. The
computed F(52,S85) statistics are all larger than twenty (see test Tl),
compared to a criticial value at the 0.05 level of 1.4. Nonetheless, the
23estimates of the other parameters (a, 6, 6 and 680) are very close to the
constrained estimates presented in Section 3.1. The point that should be
emphasised is that the empirical characterisation of different technology
fields in terms of mean value, dispersion, skewness, and decay rates does not
depend on whether one allows for variations across countries of origin. Since
the parameters a and 6 do not vary within a given technologygroup, the
ranking of countries of origin in terms of mean value is given by the ranking
in terms of p. For each country of origin the estimates of p in Table 6 imply
the same ranking of technology groups in terms of the mean value as the one
obtained from the constrained specification in Section 3.1 —indescending
order, electronics, mechanical, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
Test T2 examines the hypothesis that the differences across countries of
origin in the mean value of patent rights are stable over time. This
hypothesis implies the parameter restriction p —p—jk•2' Thecomputed
F(48,585) statistic is less than two in the chemicals, mechanical and
electronics technology groups and about five in pharmaceuticals, compared to
a critical value at the 0.05 level of about 1.4. Hence the time paths of mean
value do differ across countries of origin, but the evidence is strong only
for pharmaceuticals.
The parameter estimates in Table 6 are used to produce (by simulation)
the entire time paths of mean values for each technology field andcountry of
origin. To summarise this information, Table 7 presents index numbers for the
mean value of patent rights for the 1970—72 and 1979—81 cohorts (normalised
by the United States). The table reveals a systematic ranking of countries
of origin in terms of mean value. The typical ranking in descending order is
Japan, France, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom.The
dominance of patents of Japanese origin in the mechanical and electronics
technology fields is particularly striking. It is interesting to note that
24the ranking in terms of mean value is the same as the ranking of patent
renewal curves (see Figures 3—6).
These variations in mean value, however, do not necessarily reflect
differences in the underlying quality of patented inventions produced by the
various countries of origin. There is some selection process that determines
which patents are applied for in France, so the mean value of the observed
sample of patents from each country of origin can differ from the
unconditional mean. Presumably foreign applicants are more self—selective
than domestic ones. The table shows, however, that (apart from Japan) the
mean value of French patents is generally higher than for foreign applicants.
This suggests that at least part of the strength of Japanese patents is real,
not simply an artifact of selection. Without modelling the selection rule,
it is not possible to quantify this effect.
4.2 Exploring Variations in Rean Value
This section presents some evidence on the determinants of the variations
over time and across countries of origin in the mean value of patent rights.
It was shown that the fraction of patents granted declines sharply over the
sample period and differs systematically among countries of origin (within a
given technology group). Since the sample used for the empirical work is
designed to exclude "involuntary attrition", variations in the grant rate
should affect the mean value of patents that are eventually granted.The
first hypothesis is that variations over time in the grant rate reflect
changes in the stringency of the patent screening process and that stringent
screening weeds cut the low value patents.22This hypothesis implies a
negative correlation across cohorts between mean value and grant rate, for a
given technology group and country of origin.23The second hypothesis
25concerns the comparison across countries of origin, given the cohort and
technology group.It is reasonable to assume that the patent screening
criteria do not depend on which country is applying for the patent. Hence,
differences across countries of origin in the grant rate will reflect
differences in the distribution of the value of patent rights and should be
positively correlated with mean value. The third hypothesis is that there is
a negative correlation across cohorts between the number of patent
applications and mean value, holding grant rates constant. Such correlation
could be the result of self—selection of lower value patents into the European
patent after 1978, but it could also arise from an underlying tradeoff between
quantity and quality of patents in the search process generating inventive
output.24 These three hypotheses are tested here in the context of reduced
form relationships and no structural interpretation should be given to the
parameters.
The following specification is used
in =a0•a110ijc6.5c+ a20.jc°.j. +a3ln + (8)
whereV, 0 and A denote mean value, grant rate and the number of patent
applications, respectively. The subscripts i, j and c denote the country of
origin, technology field and cohort, respectively, and a dot denotes an
average. The disturbance 6jjcisassumed to be independently and identically
distributed. The hypotheses imply a1 > 0, a2 C 0, and a3 'C 0. The estimates
of the mean value are taken from the model with oil shocks (Table 6).
Equation (8) is estimated by ordinary least squares for each technology field
separately and pooled (including intercepts for each technology field).
Table B presents the results.All three hypotheses are strongly
supported by the evidence in each technology field, and together they account
for between a third and half of the variation in mean value. The estimate of
261 confirms that, given the cohort, countries of origin with higher grant
rates have larger mean value and the effect is large, The estimate of 02
indicates that, given the country of origin, higher grant rates for a cohort
are associated with lower mean value, with a semi—elasticity of about (minus)
unity. The estimate of a3 confirms that there is an inverse relation between
mean value and the number of patent applications, with an elasticity of about
—0.15. The parameters are estimated quite precisely, and their similarity
across technology fields is striking.The null hypothesis of homogeneity
across technology fields is not rejected —theF(9,240) statistic is 1.57,
compared to a critical value at the 0.05 level of 1.92.
This evidence indicates that the patent screening process is not random
(in relation to value of patent rights), and suggests that data on grant rates
may be a useful supplementary indicator of the mean value of patents. It is
important in this context, however, to distinguish between variations over
time and differences across countries of origin in the grant rate.
Concluding Remarks
This study provides econometric evidence on the private value of
patent rights for different technology fields and countries of origin. The
findings are derived from parametric estimation of a model of patent renewal,
applied to data on patents held in France during the period 1969—1987. The
main empirical findings can be summarised as follows. The distribution of the
private value of patent rights is sharply skewed in all technology fields,
confirming previous research using aggregate data (Schankerman and Pakes
1986). Most of the value of patent rights is accounted for by highly valuable
patents in the tail of the distribution. There are sharp differences across
technology groups, however, which fall rather neatly into two categories. The
value distributions for pharmaceuticals and chemicals are characterised by a
27low mean, less dispersion and skewness, and slow rates of depreciation.
Patents in the mechanical and electronic fields exhibit larger mean value,
greater dispersion and skewness, and faster depreciation. The property rights
generated by the patent system confer sizeable economic rents on patentees.
On the average these rents are equivalent to subsidy rate to R&D of about
15 percent. Hence patent protection is a significant source of returns to
inventive effort, but it does not appear to be the major one. This confirms
survey evidence that firms rely on a variety of mechanisms other than patents
to protect inventions. The importance of patent protection varies sharply
across technology fields, equivalent to a subsidy to R&D of 5—10 percent in
pharmaceuticals and chemicals but 15—20 percent for mechanical and electronics
patents. The surprising unimportance of patent protection in pharmaceuticals
is ascribed to effective price regulation of ethical drugs in France and hence
may not generalise to other countries.
There were substantial movements over time in the mean value of patent
rights and the number of patent applications in each technology field. An
abrupt decline occurred in patent counts and a closely timed rise in the mean
value of patent rights during the late 1970s. These changes were due mainly
to systematic self—selection of low valued patent applications into European
Patents, but more effective screening by the French Patent Office also
contributed to the increase in mean value. The two oil price shocks in 1974
and 1980 had large negative impacts on the private value of patent rights, on
the same order of magnitude as the decline in the value of firms registered
in the stock market.
There are systematic differences across countries of origin in the
mean value of patent rights. Japan and France have the largest mean value in
each technology field, followed by the United States, Germany and the United
Kingdom. Patents originating in Japan are substantially more valuable than
28for other countries and the difference is most striking for electronics
patents. It was not possible with the available data to determine how much
of these variations in mean value is due to differences in the quality of the
inventions and to self—selection in the application process. Variations in
the mean value of patent rights are correlated with patent grant rates across
countries of origin and over time.This finding suggests that the patent
screening process is not random and that patent grant rates may be a useful
supplementary indicator of the value of patents.
In terms of future research in this area, the most important task is
to conduct empirical studies of disaggregated patent renewal data for other
countries. tThe key question is whether the rankings of technology fields and
countries of origin found in this paper are confirmed in other national
markets, If so, such evidence would demonstrate the usefulness of patent
renewal data and establish empirical regularities relevant to economic policy.
If not, the task will be to identify the economic factors (including
institutional considerations) that account for variations across national
markets.
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[1) The renewal fee schedule was changed almost annually —in1968, 1970,
1972, 1974—1975, 1977—1981 and 1981—1987. Nominal fees are converted
to real terms using the CDP deflator for France. The schedules of
renewal fees (in real terms) are quite similar across cohorts.
Analysis of variance reveals that the between—cohort dimension
accounts for only about 20 percent of the total variance, the
remaining 80 percent being between—age (within—cohort) variance.
[2] Some additional nonparametric tests are summarised here (details of
test statistics are omitted for brevity).First, ifpatents of
Japaness origin are excluded, the hypothesis that the value
distributions are the same across the remaining four countries of
origin is rejected in all technology fields except electronics. This
indicates that Japan is an outlier in the electronics field (see also
the parametric estimates of mean value in Section 4).Second, the
tests in Table 2 were conducted using a finer disaggregation of
technology fields, viz., the fifteen groups comprising the four broad
technology fields used in this paper. Not surprisingly, the
hypothesis that the value distributions are the same across these
fifteen technology fields is rejected for each of the five countries
30of origin. The hypothesis that the distributions are the same across
countries of origin is rejected in 12 of the 15 technology fields (11
of 15 If Japan is excluded). Hence, some of the observed differences
across countries of origin may be due to the fact that countries
specialise in different technology fields but the available
disaggregation in the data is not fine enough to capture it. These
nonparametric findings are generally consistent with those of Pakes
and Simpson (1989) using Scandinavian data.
[3) Strictly speaking, under the stated conditions a higher mean value
would not ensure that the grant proportion would be larger. It would
be guaranteed if the distribution of the value of patent rights for
that country of origin stochastically dominates.
[43 The condition that the sequence (R.C—C.C) is non—increasing in age is
sufficient but not necessary for the renewal rule in (2) to hold. It
needs only to hold in the neighbourhood of the optimal cancellation
age.Specifically, there must exist a T for which Ra,C.C > 0 for aCT
and C 0 for OT, where T is the last age at which the patentee
pays the renewal fee.The net revenues R—C may be increasing in
some interval before T.
[5] 1 experimented with the Pareto, Weibull, and lognormal distributions.
The comparison is based on two different measures of statistical fit
suggested by Amemiya (1981): 1. the sum of squared differences between
P and where P.C is the estimate of P0 implied by the parameters
of the model, and 2. the weighted sum of squared differences between
P• and using as weights the binomial sampling variance of P,
around its true value, P.(l—P.)/& where A is the number of patents
in cohort a.The comparison is made for each technology group
separately (pooling across countries of origin). using a specification
31that allows for the mean value of patent rights to differ across
cohorts (maintaining the same coefficient of variation) and for a
constant decay rate. The lognormal fits better than the Weibull in
all four technology groups according to both fit criteria. In most
cases the lognormal also fits better than the Pareto. In those cases
where the Pareto is marginally superior, the parameter estimates for
the Pareto are not economically sensible (they imply that the renewal
rate rises with renewal fees and that the depreciation rate is
negative).
16) For the lognormal distribution, the median, mean and coefficient of
variation of initial revenues are given by exp(p2), exp(p+½ g2)and
(exp(a2)—l)'. See Johnson and Kotz (1971).
[7) Tworemarksare in order. First, the patents studied here provide
legal protection only for sales made in France (whether domestic
production or imports). This applies to all countries of origin,
including France. In this context, the assumption that the decay
rate is the same for all countries of origin within a given technology
group does not seem severe. Second, I also experiment with
specifications that allow the effect of the oil price shocks on the
decay rate to persist for several years. See note 12.
[8] Because the model in (6) is nonlinear in P, allowance for the
sampling error requires linear approximation to yield a tractable
form. The true dependent variable is y —'r1(1—P$.The observed
renewal proportion is P1, — + where v. is a binomial sampling
error with zero mean and variance P(l—P.3/A. Substituting into y
and taking a linear approximation to the nonlinear function ',Yet
—y—wv.where to— 8t'/övis evaluated at some fixed point and
32hence treated as an unknown constant over a and c. This introduces
the error term u — into the estimated equation,
9) Thecomposite error — + hasvariance c +w2P.(l—P.)/.
Themodelis estimated in three stages.Consistent estimates of the
compositeerror, c.areobtained using ordinary nonlinear least
squares. Then is regressed against a constant and F.(l—P.0)/A
using ordinary least squares and the fitted value is retrieved, F..
The model is then re—estimated using F" to perform generalised
nonlinear least squares.
[l0}The data set does not contain the number of patent applications
rejected each year for a given cohort, so it is not possible to remove
patentrejections from the raw data.Hence some of the observed
attritionof patents reflects involuntary dropouts due to the granting
procedure, but these nonrenewals are not explained by the model of
patent renewal and should be purged.Schankerman (1990) presents
evidence that the effect of patent rejections is minimal after age
three, so estimation of the patent renewal model is conducted on the
sample of patents that survive to age three.Renewal rates are
normalised by the fraction of patents that renew at age three for the
associated cohort (that is, This procedure should also take
care of the learning effects in the patent renewal decision,
documented by Fakes (1986). Fakes shows that patentees learn about
the sequence of returns at early ages and hence do not behave
according to the simple renewal rule in equation (2), but these
learning effects are completed within three to four years.
(11] The point estimates of the parameters are not consistent with the
stochastic dominance of the distribution of the initial returns for
any technology group.For the lognormal, the a—quantile of revenues,
33R, is given by exp(p+U a) where Ua is the a—quantile of the standard
normal distribution. The ratio for two different groups k and 1 is
—expQLk—,Lf+U(ak—aI)).For stochastic dominance of group k and
.1, this ratio must exceed unity for all a C(0,1). It is easily
verified that the necessary and sufficient conditions for this to hold
are>and0k— a9.
[12)The specification reported in the text forces the oil price shock to
affect only the current decay rate, so the downward revaluation of the
value of patents occurs fully during the year of the shock.In order
tocheck whether the large estimated effect is due to this restrictive
assumption,I estimated aversion of the model that permits the effect
ofthe oil shocks to persist for three years —i.e.,incorporating
separatedecay rates for each year during 1974—1976 and 1980—1982.
A comparison is made between the cumulative depreciationduring those
threeyear periods implied by this extended model with that implied by
the estimates reported in the text.The parameters in the more
flexible version imply an even larger (long run) reduction in the flow
of returns to patents (in some cases by as much as 50 percent larger),
so the conclusion stated in the text is conservative. Second, a
model with a completely free sequence of decay rates for different
years was also estimated.It provides evidence of jumps in the decay
rate after the two oil price shocks, but the individual estimates are
very imprecise.
[13] While the distribution of R0 is lognormal, the distribution of V is
not since lognormality is only preserved under multiplication of
random variables. The procedure to generate quantiles is based on
drawing 50,000 random numbers from a lognormal distribution
parameterised by tanda. For each draw, the estimate of 6 and
36observed renewal fees are used to compute the optimal expiration date
according to the renewal rule (equation (4) in Section 3.1), and the
associated net value of patent rights for that draw is generated.In
this way the entire distribution of the value of patent rights is
simulated. Simulations based on perturbations of p, a and 8 are used
to compute numerical derivatives of the quantiles with respect to
parameters and standard errors for the quantiles are constructed by
the delta method. The generalisation for the model with year—specific
decay rates 874andisstraightforward.
[14] The fraction of total value in the top percentile of patents is given
by ó.I V99/V where V99 denotes the value for the top percentile and
V is the mean value for all patents in the cohort. This is a
conservative estimate since it assigns the lower bound value Vgg to
all patents in the top percentile. For the top five percent of
patents, the figure is computed using values for the 0.95, 0.975 (not
reported in the table) and 0.99 quantiles as follows:(0.025 V95 +
0.015V975 + 0.01 V.99. The specific estimates in percentage terms
for the top one (five) percent of patents are 12 (34) in
pharmaceuticals, 14 (38) in chemicals, 21 (50) for mechanical, and 24
(55) for electronics excluding Japan. Inclusion of Japan in
electronics raises the figure by about five percentage points. The
estimates based on the model without oil shocks are almost identical.
[15)As noted in Section 1, the grant rate is much larger for
pharmaceuticals and chemicals than for the other technology fields,
for each country oforigin. The conventional wisdom isthat
inventions in these technologies are more "patentable" because of the
nature of patent law.An alternative explanation is that patent
examiners screen patents according to some fixed cutoff (defined in
35terms of "inventive step") which is correlated with patent values, and
that the distributions of patent values in pharmaceuticals and
chemicals stochastically dominate those in the other fields. However,
the estimates of mean values in Table 4 are not consistent with this
second explanation (see also footnote 11). Hence the evidence
suggests, albeit indirectly, that differences in grant rates do
reflect a systematic bias in patent law that favors "patentability" of
inventions in pharmaceuticals and chemicals.
(161 The subsidy rates reported in the text are based on the mean values
from the fixed effects model with oil shocks (Table 4). If the model
without oil shocks is used, the subsidy rate for company—funded R&D
(total R&D) varies from 3,4 (3.3) percent in pharmaceuticals to 24.8
(15.0) percent in electronics.The main conclusions in the text are
unchanged.
[17] Using aggregate patent renewal data for France, Schankerman and Pakes
(1986) estimate a subsidy rate on company—funded R&D for the 1970
cohort of 6.8 percent. They measure the value of patent rights for
patents that survive until age five and include returns accruing from
age five of the patent. In the present study the parameters of the
model are estimated using patents that survive until age three, but
the mean value of patent rights is simulated using these parameters to
characterise the entire population of patents and to include all
returns from the date of application. To make them comparable, the
subsidy rate reported here must be multiplied by I(l—6)/(l+i)iP5,
where P5 is the proportion of patents that survive until age five.
Using 6 —0.1,i —0.1and P5 —0.7(sample mean), the average subsidy
rate for company—funded R&D reported in the text translates to 6.2
percent.
36(18] The specific guidelines for setting prices have changed over time.
Prior to 1972, prices were set to compensate the patentee for the
basic raw materials and capital investment, plus some allowance for a
"profit margin".Since 1972 prices are set more informally, with no
explicit allowance either forproduction or R&D costs, but economising
on health costs is an officially stated objective. I would like to
thank Ms Virgine Perotin of the Centre d'Etude des Revenu et des Couts
(CERC) in Paris for helpful discussions of pharmaceutical regulation
in France.
(191 The mean values for each cohort are based on the parameter estimates
frmthefixed effects model with oil shocks. The time paths of mean
and total value are similar for the model without oil shocks, except
that the declines in mean value for cohorts 1973—1975 are less sharp.
The electronics sector includes patents originating in Japan1 but this
does not affect the time path.
(20] To measure how much of the overall decline in patent applications is
due to the European patent, I computed (using other data sources) for
each technology group the total number of patent applications
applicable to France in 1982, including both national patents and
European patents with France as a designated country. The results
show that all of the decline in Figures 7—10 is due to self—selection
into European patents, except in pharmaceuticals where about a quarter
of the decline can be explained in this way. See Schankerman (1990)
for details.
(21]The logarithm of the mean level of initial returns for country of
origin i in technology group jforcohort a, r, is + g2•The
time paths for countries .1 and k are the same if and only if r —r
is independent of a. This is the condition given in the text.
37[22]It is not necessary that patent examiners themselves screen
systematically according to patent values. Even if they randomly
reject some fraction of applications, self—selection by potential
patentees on the basis of expected profitability of patenting
(including the probability of rejection) would generate the same
result.
[23] One alternative hypothesis is that variations in the grant proportion
are due to differences across cohorts in the underlying distribution
of the value of patent applications, in which case the expected
correlation would be positive.It should also be recalled that grant
fractions are defined here as the percentage of applications of a
given cohort that are eventually granted (not those granted in a
particular year). so that granting lags do not directly affect these
grant fractions or their relationship to mean value.
[24] The first evidence of an inverse relationship between patent counts
and mean value (neglecting grant fractions) was reported in
Schankerman and Pakes (1986). For more discussion of the
interpretation of this finding, see ?akes and Simpson (1989).
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Technology Field
Country Pharmaceuticals Chemicals MechanicalElectronics
Germany 90.0 92.2 93.8 91.1
66.0 71.6 43.5 70.9
France 89.5 94.6 92.7 91.9
89.3 83.7 57.7 73.2
United Kingdom 86.7 89.5 93.1 87.3
76.2 65.5 36.3 48.8
Japan 94.1 96.7 97.2 96.4
91.6 86.1 61.2 70.1
U.s. 89.5 92.5 93.8 92.2
82.4 70.1 41.6 60.0
Number of 1249 5911 14,112 9245
Applications 250 3153 8,835 5668
Notes.The top figure in each cell refers to the average for the
1970—1972 cohorts, the lower figure for the 1979—1981 cohorts.
To minimise truncation bias for later cohorts, the number of
grants in the last available year must be less than five percent
of cumulated grants from that cohort (this required deleting
cohorts after 1982).Table 2.Nonparanietric Tests on Renewal Rates for Technology Fields and
Countries of Origin
Panel A Panel B
Test for Equality Test for Equality




Germany 32 14.1 Pharmaceuticals 31 18.1
France 32 28.4 Chemicals 41 39.0
U.K. 32 10.8 Mechanical 41 22.6
Japan 32 19.8 Electronics 41 50.3
U.s. 32 9.6
Notes.The numberofrestrictions for the Chi—square test is denoted by





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 4. Distribution of the Value of Patent Rights for the 1970 Cohort.
by Technology Group: Oil Shock Model
Phano Chem Mech Elect Elect
(excluding Japan)
Quant ii e
0.25 515 447 638 1,450 627
(128) (103) (312) (1,256) (279)
0.50 1,631 1,594 2,930 7,933 3,159
(539) (591) (1,666) (9.228) (1,708)
0.75 5,427 5,807 13,769 46,964 16,322
(2,437) (2,859) (9,935) (53,265) (11,055)
0.90 11,787 13,735 40,840 170,958 53,122
(6,061) (7,039) (35,547) (315,079) (58,822)
0.95 19,920 24,363 83,857 402,292 113,403
(11,211)(13,814) (81,228) (826,778) (105,162)
0.99 52,139 69,906321,966 2,016,797 481,429
(34,565) (46,983) (375,386)(4,984,719) (538,827)
Mean 4,313 4,96915,120 68,502 19,837
(1,995) (2,591) (13,692) (134,208) (18,020)
Notes,
Figures refer to the private value of patent rights (in 1980 U.S.
dollars), measured from date of patent application. They are
simulated using parameter estimates for the lognormal patent renewal
model with fixed cohort effects and constant decay rate in Table 3.
The discount rate is set at 0.10. Estimated standard errors in




1. Applications, A 1199 6188 14,290 8863
2. Mean Value&, V 4313 4969 15,120 19,837
($1980)
3. A V/R&DC 004l 0.072 0.299 0.354






a Mean value estimates are taken from Table 4.
bThe procedure to construct estimates of R&D by technology field is
described in Appendix 2. R&Dc and R&D1 refer to company—funded and
total R&D, respectively.
cThe weighted averages are constructed using R&Dfigures.Table 6. Parameter Estimates for the Patent Renewal Model with Country
of Origin Differences: Oil Shock Version
Parameter Pharmaceuticals ChemicalsMechanicalElectronics
fl970
Germany 7.09 7.19 8.05 8.52
(0.24) (0.23) (0.35) (0.44)
France 7.84 1.71 8.45 9.27
(0.29) (0.26) (0.39) (0.51)
United Kingdom 7.09 6.95 7.89 8.34
(0.24) (0.22) (0.34) (0.43)
Japan 7.36 7.81 9.17 10.44
(0.25) (0.27) (0.44) (0.62)
United States 7.10 7.20 8.23 8.89
(0.24) (0.23) (0.37) (0.48)
a 1.36 1.51 2.10 2.34
(0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.22)
0.027 0.041 0.111 0.144
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.029)
574 0.400 0.429 0.542 0.650
(0.054) (0.051) (0.056) (0.055)
680 0.224 0.211 0.327 0.376
(0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.047)
0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98
mse 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
df 568 583 583 583
Ti 23.31 23.86 35.98 65.24
T2 5.11 1.72 2.12 1.95
Notes.
All estimates are from the lognormal patent renewal model, allowing
for binomial sampling error and constant variance renewal error. The
model allows for a full set of cohort/country of origin interactions
for itandyear effects in 6 for 1974 and 1980. Estimated standard
errors are in parentheses.Table 7, Mean Values of Patent Rights, by Country of Origin
(normalized by United States)
1970—72 Cohort
PharmaceuticalsChemicalsMechanicalElectronics
Germany 0.95 1.05 0.82 0.67
France 2.05 1.66 1.30 1.51
United Kingdom 1.00 0.78 0.72 0.57
Japan 1.47 1.97 2.81 4.70
U.S. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1979—81 Cohort
PharmaceuticalsChemicalsMechanicalElectronics
Germany 0.76 1.16 1.10 0.87
France 1.29 1.48 0.92 1.08
United Kingdom 0.64 0.99 0.70 0.77
Japan 1.46 2.59 3.54 6.15
U.S. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes.
These index numbers are computed from simulated mean values based on
the parameter estimates presented in Table 6. Mean values are
averaged for the 1970—72 and 1979—81 cohorts to remove transitory
variations.Table 8. Parameter Estimates for the Mean Value Equation
Tharacceuticals Chemicals Mechanical ElectronicsPooled
Parameter
Intercept 8.20 8.47 9.90 10.88 8.21









01 3.19 4.22 4.29 6.91 4.80
(0.74) (0.65) (0.70) (1.17) (0.43)
—0.85 —1.01 —0.66 —1.12 —0.87
(1.41) (0.55)(0.31) (0.84) (0.26)
03 —0.04 —0.11 —0.24 —0.25 —0.14
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.04)
K2 0.24 0.44 0.46 0.37 0.85
df 61 61 61 61 253
Notes.
Estimatesare for the mean value equation (8) in the text, where Dc,
D)jandDE are technology group dummies for chemicals, mechanical and
electronics, respectively. Estimated standard errors are in
parentheses.ft tire
Age
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